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human freedoms (Sen, 1999b). He believed that development policies are value based. 
Moreover, development is viewed as a multidimensional process. However, in the hierarchy of 
importance, he argues that social development efforts are more important. ―Agency,‖ according to 
Sen (1999b), is the ―ability to pursue goals that one values and has reason to value‖ (p. 19). To 
him, agency reflects both people themselves as well as benevolent social groups acting on their 
behalf.  
Implications for social work and reproductive health. A major implication of Sen‘s theoretical 
perspectives to the fields of social work and reproductive health is that it can serve as a 
comprehensive and unifying theoretical framework to guide the bridging of micro and macro 
approaches and is a model consistent with social work values.  
At a micro practice level, improvements in reproductive health should be assessed in terms 
of reproductive capabilities. However, this approach recognizes that people differ in their values 
regarding their health, and that different people require different resources to reach their valued 
outcomes (Alkire & Deneulin, 2009a). Social workers must be respectful of these values in 
helping clients meet their needs. However, they must also help to dispel detrimental myths and 
combat influences of adverse groups.  
One key element to enhancing people‘s capabilities is to empower women and their families 
to be agents of their own health through increasing their reproductive capacities.  Thus, social 
workers should help transform communities and individuals to be their own agents of change. 
Additionally, as problems are placed external to individual, social workers can help combat 
structural changes.  
At the development level, the human development perspective holds that developmental 
policies are normative, but social development efforts are more important. Consequently, social 
workers at the policy and practice levels should lobby for and assist in the implementation of 
social policies that enhance people‘s choices and social relationships, such as universal health 
care.  
Conclusion. In conclusion, Sen‘s perspectives are compatible with social work values, and 
have utility to both the field of reproductive health and the field of social work to address 
reproductive health matters. With helpful implications of how social work can address the 
reproductive health of women, especially in developing countries, it is a perspective well worth 
exploring.  
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The central task of my doctoral research project is to develop a distinctive account on the 
philosophical uses of the concept of dignity, which is a key-concept in Martha Nussbaum‘s 
philosophical version of the capability approach. With regard to the role of this concept as 
foundational point of reference for all central claims, I think that we should not neglect the lack of 
a systematical and exhaustible account on what human dignity exactly means . 
Due to the central role of that concept in the capability approach, I disagree with Nussbaum who 
seems to assume that it is enough to have only an intuitive understanding of that concept. 
 
Reconstructing the Concept of Dignity 
Of course, in my work I  going first to systematize the implicit and explicit uses of the concept in 
the framework of the Capability Approach.  However, in order to elaborate on that concept I  going 
to focus on how that concept has been developed within the philosophical tradition of the 
Personalism, where ―dignity‖ is a central and constant theme. Here I will refer for example to 
Gabriel Marcel‘s ―Willi Jes‘s Lectures‖,   published under the title ―The existential background of 
human dignity‖. It seems to me that these lectures can contribute very much to the clarification of 
the concept of human dignity, because they put it in different theoretical contexts. I find for 
example very fruitful the personalist defending of human dignity against those philosophical 
movements, which subordinate the individual upon anonymous collective forces, and which 
thereby function as forms of dehumanization. Gabriel Marcel uses the term as a result of what he 
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nes ―the spirit of abstraction‖. By this  he means  ‖ the inability to treat human being as human 
being and for this human being the substituting of a certain idea, a certain abstract designation‖. It 
seems that the figure of dehumanization is common place for attacks of all of personalist. They all 
criticize these figures insisting on the idea of absolute human dignity and the inter-relational 
kernel of the human personality. Regarding the critique on the economic utilitarism in the 
capability approach I thing that it could be very instructive to see how personalists use the figure 
of dehumanization to criticize both the radical forms of collectivism and individualism.  According 
to the personalists both collectivism and individualism do not gasp the dual nature of human 
beings as having inviolable dignity as separate persons and in the se time as having an essential 
social relationality. According to the tradition of personalism, humanity is characterized on the one 
hand by terms like uniqueness, freedom, self-consciousness, inner life, transcendence, the ability 
of self-determination, and creativity, and by the principle of essential relationality on the other, 
expressed in terms like solidarity and fraternity. Here the Other appears as a gift, as ―the other of 
myself‖. This core dimension of human inert-personality, as basic condition of dignity cannot be 
grasped by the utilitarian approach.  
In my work I will carry out systematic conceptual analyses on the various links between the 
concept of dignity and several motives and arguments in the personalism I only sketched here. 
However, I also realize that the personalism is in fact very pluralistic and sometimes eclectic , so it 
would be  difficult to reconstruct coherent lines of using the concept of dignity. Nevertheless I 
think that it is important to investigate that alternative context of use of the concept, in order to 
develop different perspectives on it. I believe that despite the more or less fragmentary definitions 
of the concept in this tradition, we could achieve a coherent reconstruction of it by using some 
insights from the Analytical philosophy originating in Wittgenstein‘s late work. I  thinking here in 
first instance about the idea that philosophy as conceptual analysis is on its right place in 
situations of misunderstanding, disagreement and language disorientation. This notion of 
philosophy has its origin in the understanding of Wittgenstein that the meanings of word are in 
given in its uses, and that our conflicts and disagreements usually depend from our inability to 
understand these uses in their differences and similarities.  I rely especially on Wittgenstein‘s 
conception of family resemblances, according to which it is  important to identify the distinct uses 
of the concept of dignity in the research fields.  Then we must put the question, which of these 
uses could claim universal validity, and which of them could serve as a ground for common 
agreement. 
 
After achieving a clearer notion of  the concept I should elaborate on the question, how this 
semantic content is inter-related to the other dimensions of the capability approach. 
Research Desiderata: On the ground of a systematically reconstructed concept of dignity I 
should reexamine the main claims of Nussbaum‘s philosophical version of capability approach 
and I should also confront them with some questions, which are crucial for the whole approach: 
1. Could we have strong arguments to insist that 10 capabilities are in equal degree connected 
with what respect and self-respect of every one as human being requires? Or, as Amartya 
Sen insists, what is valuable according to her human flourishing is a question of particular 
practical reasons, according to her particular needs? 
2. Could we justify an universalistic anthropological claim about the political nature of human 
animals? Or, are there also non-political forms of human dignity and of humanity in general? 
3. Is the fixation of a list of capabilities a limitation of possibilities for innovative practices and 
for plural values linked with plural notions of human dignity? 
Although I emphasize some open questions, my aim is not to criticize the universal dimension of 
capability approach. On the contrary, with regard to Nussbaum‘s discussion on the three unsolved 
problems of justice, it seems to me much more promising to solve them in the field of a 
philosophical anthropology and a theory of justice based on human dignity, then in the logic on a 
disembodied rationality or on the ground of the ability of language, witch not all human beings 
share in the se degree.  
 
